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EFFECTUATING CENSORSHIP: CIVIC
REPUBLICANISM AND THE SECONDARY
EFFECTS DOCTRINE
BRANDON K. LEMLEY*

INTRODUCTION

In 1919, Justice Holmes wrote of free speech that "the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideasthat the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market[.]"'
The First Amendment' stands as both a hallmark and
fountainhead of American independence.3 It encourages the open
flow of ideas by limiting government intrusion on both speech and
expressive conduct.4 Underlying the First Amendment is the

*

Law clerk to United States Magistrate Judge Roger B. Cosbey for the

Northern District of Indiana.
1. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
3. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (Cardozo, J.)
(characterizing the First Amendment as "the matrix, the indispensable
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom"); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (characterizing First Amendment protections as existing
to "assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people"); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) stating:
When man was first in the jungle he took care of himself. When he
entered a societal group, controls were necessarily imposed. But our
society-unlike most in the world-presupposes that freedom and
liberty are in a frame of reference that makes the individual, not
government, the keeper of his tastes, beliefs, and ideas. That is the
philosophy of the First Amendment; and it is the article of faith that
sets us apart from most nations in the world);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) (stating that the "freedom of
speech... secured by the First Amendment... [is] among the fundamental
personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons").
4. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (striking a
regulation prohibiting the display of a symbol one knows arouses anger,
alarm, or resentment as facially invalid proscription of free expression);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308-11 (1940) (maintaining that even
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philosophy that the individual is the "keeper of his tastes, beliefs,
and ideas."5 However, time, technology, and culture have greatly
expanded the scope of free speech, leaving many wondering
whether free speech has gone too far. In a marketplace of ideas,
are there some ideological products which are simply unfit for
mental "consumption"?
Many critical First Amendment scholars maintain that free
speech jurisprudence must, and is, shifting to meet a "realistic
view of what free speech can do."' Civic republican theorists,7 in

where the state has the ability to regulate speech, it must not "unduly"
infringe the protected freedom); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)
(striking a Texas statute criminalizing desecration of the flag as a contentbased prohibition on free expression).
5. ParisAdult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 73 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
6. Richard Delgado, First Amendment Formalism is Giving Way to First
Amendment Legal Realism, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169, 170 (1994).
Delgado argues that a "formalistic" theory of free speech, which "view[s] ...
speech as a near-perfect instrument for testing ideas and promoting social
progress[,]" has undergone a transformation towards a new sense of First
Amendment legal realism, which "looks to self and class interest, linguistic
science, politics, and other tools of the realist approach to understand how
expression functions in our political system." Id.
7. For the purposes of this Article, I use the terms "civic republican" and
"republican" interchangeably. However, "republican" in no way connotes
modern partisan government. Rather, civic republicanism is a strain of
political theory in which "republican approaches [to governance] posit the
existence of a common good, to be found at the conclusion of a well-functioning
deliberative process." Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539, 1554 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond the Revival]. Modern
republican theory, in many ways, relies on classical republicanism as
envisioned by the likes of Locke and Madison, where "[b]ehind this republican
discourse is a tradition of political philosophy with roots in Aristotle's Politics,
Cicero's Res Publica, Machiavelli, Harrington, Bolingbroke .... The pursuit
of public good is privileged over private interests, and freedom means
participation in civic life rather than protection of individual rights from
interference."
Isaac Kramnick, The "Great National Discussion": The
Discourseof Politicsin 1787, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 4-5 (1988). This conception
of government maintains that sovereignty belongs to "We the People" rather
than the government itself. See CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH xvi (1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM
OF FREE SPEECH]. As such, the republican system of government creates a

"'government by discussion,' in which outcomes would be reached through
broad public deliberation." Id. Moreover, the republican political system "is
characterized by a belief in universalism ... in the possibility of mediating
different approaches to politics, or different conceptions of the public good,
through discussion and dialogue. The process of mediation is designed to
produce substantively correct outcomes ....
" Sunstein, Beyond the Revival,
supra, at 1554. In this way, modern notions of civic republicanism urge that
"republican constitutional thought is not indissolubly tied to any ...static,
parochial, or coercive communitarianism; that, indeed, reconsideration of
republicanism's deeper constitutional implications can remind us of how the
renovation of political communities, by inclusion of those who have been
excluded, enhances everyone's political freedom." Frank Michelman, Law's
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particular, maintain that the freedom of speech has expanded too
far and currently safeguards much speech unworthy of
constitutional protection.8 In their progressive attempt to achieve
the common good, civic republicans, like Cass Sunstein, 9 contend
that a sort of "New Deal" is needed for free speech." That is, just
as Roosevelt's New Deal "self-consciously rejected the system of
laissez-faire [economics and] ... gave rise to an extensive national
government, with a wide array of regulatory agencies displacing
market arrangements," 1 so too, Sunstein and civic republicans
argue that government and private entities should displace the
free market of speech with regulations designed to promote the
common good. Under this theoretical framework, private and
governmental restrictions on free speech are necessary to achieve
Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495 (1988).
8. See SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at xviii

(stating that "[clurrently American law protects much speech that ought not
be protected").
9. Republican conceptions of politics and law vary greatly from one
theorist to another. Sunstein, Beyond the Revival, supra note 7, at 1547;
Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L.
REV. 193, 210 n.51 (1996). However, this paper focuses ostensibly on Cass
Sunstein, who is perhaps the most prominent civic republican theorist to have
written extensively on the First Amendment. For discussions of the modern
civic republican movement, see generally Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of
Democracy in American ConstitutionalArgument: The Case of Pornography
Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291 (1989); Michelman, supra note 7; Sunstein,
Beyond the Revival, supra note 7. But see generally Kathryn Abrams, Law's
Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591 (1988); Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The
Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609 (1988); Paul Brest,
Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97
YALE L.J. 1623 (1988); Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or The
Flight From Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633 (criticizing Michelman and
Sunstein's conception of republicanism); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is
Republicanism and Is It Worth Reviving, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1695 (1989);
Michael A. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic
Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651 (1988); Linda K. Kerber, Making
Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663 (1988); Jonathan R. Macey, The
Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1673 (1988); Jerry
Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685 (1988); H.
Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1703 (1988); Suzanna
Sherry, Civic Virtue and The Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication,
72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97
YALE L.J. 1713 (1988).
10. See SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 28-29.
11. Id. at 29. Sunstein discusses the transformation in constitutional
thinking that occurred during this period. He maintains that similar to the
First Amendment's protection of speech, pre-New Deal constitutional theory
viewed the Constitution as a shield to protect against governmental regulation
of existing rights and entitlements. Id. It was for this reason that, prior to
the New Deal, the Court invalidated minimum wage and maximum hour laws
as unconstitutional takings from the employers for the benefit of the public at
large. Id. (citing Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) and
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
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progressive cultural reform.
Similar to Sunstein's theoretical approach to censorship, the
Supreme Court has created avenues for censorship that resonate
with republican overtones. Although exceptions to the First
Amendment's free speech guarantee have existed since its
inception, 12 one current stand of free speech analysis, the
secondary effects doctrine, has the potential to substantially
censor expression. The secondary effects doctrine allows the
government to enact legislation that ostensibly targets
disfavored-but protected-speech where the purpose is to reduce
the harmful non-speech antecedent effects that derive from certain
types of speech.13 While the secondary effects doctrine, in its
inception, applied
to zoning
regulations
for adult-use
establishments like strip clubs and adult bookstores and
theaters, 14 the application of the doctrine has progressively

12. Society, as well as the Supreme Court, has permitted limitations on the
freedom of expression since the First Amendment's inclusion in the Bill of
Rights. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)
(finding that the "right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances"); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727, 741 (1996) (Breyer, J.) (stating that the "government may directly
regulate speech to address extraordinary problems, where its regulations are
appropriately tailored to resolve those problems without imposing an
unnecessarily great restriction on speech"); ParisAdult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at
61-66 (discussing the ability of government to restrict commercial, business,
and associational speech); R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 382-83 (noting that "[flrom 1791
to the present, however, our society, like other free but civilized societies, has
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas");
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that expressive
conduct may be narrowly regulated in pursuit of an important or substantial
governmental interest that is unrelated to the content of expression).
Notwithstanding, this Article ostensibly focuses on the continued validity of a
broad-and expanding-application of the secondary effects doctrine.
13. The secondary effects doctrine, which will be discussed in depth below,
is a method of First Amendment analysis that essentially reduces the severity
of scrutiny with which the courts analyze a restriction where a purpose behind
the regulation is to reduce negative secondary effects that can be associated
with the speech. See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects
Doctrine:"The Evisceration of FirstAmendment Freedoms,"37 WASHBURN L.J.
55, 60 (1997). Thus, if the government justifies the speech restriction "without
reference to the content of the regulated speech," then the courts will analyze
a content-based restriction under the less stringent intermediate test for
content neutrality. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48
(1986). The secondary effects rationale is most frequently used to regulate
adult-use establishments like strip clubs, adult bookstores, and adult movie
theaters. See Hudson, supra at 61 (noting that the secondary effects doctrine
deeply impacts the free speech issues concerning adult material).
14. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976)
(upholding a zoning ordinance prohibiting an adult movie theatre within 1000
feet of any other regulated use); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S.
at 54 (upholding a statute that prohibited the operation of adult movie
theatres within 1000 feet of residences, churches, parks, and schools based on
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expanded. Indeed, decisions by the Supreme Court indicate a
willingness to continue the doctrine's expansion and many lower
courts have allowed for substantial displacement of a citizen's
ability to engage in certain types of expression, be it symbolic or
actual speech.
I posit that there is a fundamental nexus between Sunstein's
civic republican thought and the secondary effects doctrine: what
the former theorizes the latter effectuates. This Article takes the
position that an expansion of republican thought in and through
free speech theories, like the secondary effects doctrine, amounts
to little more than governmental imposition of popular morality.
Both threaten to censor vernacular and fringe forms of expression
that garner the First Amendment's full protection from
governmental impropriety. Civic republicanism and the secondary
effects doctrine share a basic common denominator rooted in
censorship.
The government acts as the paternal censor,
selectively shielding "the public from some kinds of speech on the
ground that they are more offensive than others.""
Part I examines Cass Sunstein's civic republican approach to
freedom of speech." Part II offers an introduction into general free
speech analysis and content discrimination specifically. Part III
discusses the history of the secondary effects doctrine and its
application to different areas of free speech analysis. Part IV asks
whether either approach can successfully bring about a better
society of governance.
I.

CIVIc REPUBLICANISM AND FREE SPEECH

A. Conceptualizing Civic Republican Politics
Civic republican thought, as championed by Cass Sunstein,
contends that the function of politics "is to select values ... or to
provide opportunities for preference formation rather than simply
to implement existing desires."17 That is, in the republican form of
governance created by the United States Constitution, the
government should do more than to simply appease parsimonious
interest groups." Instead, the republican political system should

the negative secondary effects-increased crime, prostitution-associated with
such adult use establishments).
15. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (maintaining
that when the government acts as censor, protecting the people from offensive

expression, then the "First Amendment strictly limits its power").
16. I have devoted a substantial amount of space to the thought of
Sunstein, which as a cognitive whole maintains a rational footing with a

conception of the freedom of expression as conceived by the founding fathers,
and particularly by James Madison.
17. Sunstein, Beyond the Revival, supra note 7, at 1545.
18. Sunstein asserts that under a pluralistic system of politics, "politics
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strive to achieve a coherent common good through mediation and
deliberation based on a "commitment to political empathy."9
Political empathy, in turn, requires elected representatives to
assume positions as both proponents and opponents, make
concerted efforts to set value preferences, and then enact
regulations based on those values.'
For Sunstein, this republican theory is firmly located in the
The Madisonian conception of
ideals of James Madison.21
representation posits that civic virtue defines the very essence of
citizenship. Thus, in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Madison
stated:
consists of a struggle among interest groups for scarce social resources. Laws
are a kind of commodity, subject to forces of supply and demand." Id. at 1542.
Instead of a system marked by self-serving infighting for market allocation,
republican thought champions the "conception of individual autonomy as
involving selection rather than implementation of ends, and the republican
conception of political freedom, which prizes collective self-determination." Id.
at 1548.
19. Id. at 1555. Sunstein maintains that in a pluralistic system marked by
infighting among interest groups, the notion of the common good is both
mystical and tyrannical. Id. at 1554. In contrast, the republican system
arises out of practical reason in which compromise is necessary and the
government must "attempt to select and pronounce values" that reflect a
coherent commitment to all citizens. Id. at 1555.
20. See id. at 1555. However, Sunstein is careful to note that not every
issue should be subject to the unitary public good. For example, he maintains
that issues of religion should be entirely off limits to politics and political
preference setting. Id. "The republican position is not that every issue is
subject to political resolution; it is instead that some questions can yield
general agreement[s] through deliberation." Id.
21. See Sunstein, Beyond the Revival, supra note 7, at 1558 (noting how
The
Madison's thought differed from classical republican thought).
fundamental foundational tenet of Madison thought resides in Madison's
definition of a republic. Madison defined a republic as "a government which
derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people,
and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for a
limited period, or during good behavior." THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 241
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Indeed, Sunstein proclaims his
heavy reliance on Madison's thought in formulating his notion of civic
republicanism.
But see J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as
ConstitutionalCategories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935, 1955-56 (1995) (reviewing CASS
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993)). However,
Balkin maintains that Sunstein's reliance on the ideas of James Madison
could be better understood as a reliance on the thought of the American
philosopher John Dewey. Id. at 1956. Balkin argues that Sunstein's emphasis
on society's need to shape its preferences to serve public and democratic ends
is more closely tied with the thought of Dewey than to James Madison. Id. In
Dewey's thought, society's interest supercedes self-serving individual
interests, resulting in individual conformity with societal interest because
individualism and individual rights are social constructs designed to serve the
larger societal interests. Id. Balkin suggests that while Dewey was one of
America's greatest philosophers, he was neither a founding father nor did he
pen the words of the First Amendment, as did Madison. Id.
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I go on this great republican principle, that the people will have
virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. Is there
no virtue among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation.
No theoretical checks, no form of government, can render us secure.
To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or
happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea. If
there be sufficient virtue and intelligence in the community, it will
be exercised in the selection of these men; so that we do not depend
on their virtue, or put confidence in our rulers, but in the people
who are to choose them.22
Maintenance of the Madisonian, or originalist, conception of
politics depends on representation of virtuous leaders elected by a
virtuous populace.2" Indeed, John Jay emphasized that the state
legislatures should select "those men only who have become the
24
Today,
most distinguished by their abilities and [their] virtue."
of
civic-mindedness
high
degree
whose
these are the very men
allows them to supposedly operate above the pressures amassed by
self-serving interest groups.25 Consequently, the well-functioning,
virtuous republican democracy determines that "some values are
superior to others"2" and then governs in the manner designed to
effectuate those superior values.
B.

Sunstein's Republican Approach to the FirstAmendment: The
Case Against Free Speech

As applied to free speech, Sunstein argues that the current
constitutional analysis threatens to undermine legitimate efforts
to effectuate popular sovereignty. 27 For Sunstein, the problem
with the First Amendment is that it protects too much speech that
has "little or no connection with democratic aspirations
8
Critics of free speech
and.. .produces serious social harm."

22. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

STATE
535-37

(1888).
23. See Sunstein, Beyond the Revival, supra note 7, at 1561 (noting that
Madison maintained that the republican form of government called "for more
virtue from the citizenry than any other form").
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 391 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
25. See Sunstein, Beyond the Revival, supra note 7, at 1559 (discussing
Madison's conception of representative government).
26. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 31-32 (1985).
27. SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at xviii.
Sunstein maintains that society is now in the process of rethinking the
existent structures of traditional democratic government; specifically he
mentions "campaign finance regulation, broadcasting law, and the electoral
process in general." Id. at xviii-xix. He further maintains that "[t]he First
Amendment should not be an obstacle to this process of rethinking." Id. at
xix.
28. Id. at xviii.
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frequently note that, certainly, when the founding fathers first
negotiated the Bill of Rights and the First Amendment, they did
not envision the breadth or depth of its future application. 29 The
founders did not foresee that freedom of speech would be heralded
as a defense to sadistic pederasty," obscenity,31 hatred,32
unabashed eroticism, 3 and other various embodiments of the
immoral and illegal. However, Sunstein, unlike other critics, is
willing to argue that the invocation of free speech, in seemingly
innocuous areas-like television and radio broadcasting, campaign
finance laws, rights and duties of newspapers, and governmental
secrecy-threatens to undermine the very nature
of democracy
and the deliberative value of the First Amendment. 3 4
1. Deliberative Value of the FirstAmendment
Sunstein conceptualizes the First Amendment's speech
guarantee through a Madisonian lens focused on the "right of
29. See SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at xiv

(noting that the founding fathers had a far narrower conception of free
speech); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1971) (arguing that the founding fathers only
intended to protect political speech); Pnina Lahav, The Chicago Conspiracy
Trial: Character and Judicial Discretion, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1327, 1344
(2000) (stating that "[clertainly, no one could claim that the founders, fathers
of the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, were models of an open mind"); Robert
Peters, "Marketplaceof Ideas" or Anarchy: What Will Cyberspace Become?, 51
MERCER L. REV. 910, 911 (2000) (asking whether the founding fathers would
have granted First Amendment protection to the transmission of images of a
woman masturbating over the Internet); Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, How
Imminent is Imminent?: The Imminent Danger Test Applied to Murder
Manuals, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 47, 49 (1997) (noting that the framers of
the Constitution likely envisioned limits on the right of free expression);
Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment:
In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 1165 n.25
(1982) (stating that "[t]here can be little doubt that whatever the framers
intended, it was not absolutism").
30. For a discussion of the civil wrongful death action against the North
American Man Boy Love Association ("NAMBLA") and NAMBLA's free speech
defense, see generally Cheryl Wetzstein, ACLU to Defend Boy-Sex Group;
Lawsuit Stems from Homosexual Murder of 10-Year-Old, WASH. TIMES, Sept.
1, 2000, at A3.
31. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (discussing the
standards used to identify "obscene" material and the antecedent scope of
state regulation).
32. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379 (1992)
(discussing free speech in the context of state hate crime statutes).
33. See generally City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Barnes v.
Glenn Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109
(1972); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1972); Schad v. Borough
of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (all discussing free speech with respect
to adult entertainment establishments).
34. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at
93-121.
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freely examining public characters and measures, and of free
communication among people[.]" 35 He explains that Madison
"place[d] a high premium on political (not economic) equality and
on the deliberative functions of politics." 36 That is, free expression
highlights the struggle to understand a connection between the
notions of popular sovereignty and free speech.37 Sunstein argues
that the First Amendment functions as the means through which
society might achieve "a certain conception of democratic
government, one that promotes political discussion." 3 Free speech
ensures the exchange of meaningful discussion, and "its overriding
goal is to allow judgments to emerge through general discussions
and debates."39
Armed with his particularized view of the First Amendment
as a political tool for attaining a deliberative democracy, Sunstein
attacks popular conceptions of free speech. Indeed, Sunstein lays
siege on Justice Holmes' open market conception of free speech
contained in his dissenting opinion in Abrams."
Sunstein
maintains that the central problem in Holmes' dissent is that the
opinion evinces skepticism about understandings of truth, because
truth is "defined by reference to what emerges through 'free trade
in ideas."' For Holmes, it seems to have no deeper status. The
competition of the market is the governing conception of free
speech.""
Moreover, Sunstein argues that Holmes' writings
35. Id. at xvii. See also James Madison, Report of 1800, (Jan. 7, 1800), in
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 341 (David Matern, et al., eds. 1991).
36. SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at xvii.
37. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 257
(1992) (discussing how rooting a conception of free speech in the principle of
popular sovereignty demonstrates that current First Amendment analysis is
off the mark).
38. SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 27-28
(discussing Justice Brandeis' civic conception of speech).
39. Sunstein, supra note 37, at 314.
40. See SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 23-26
(discussing Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams). In Abrams, Justice Holmes
wrote in his dissent:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment. . . . I think that we should be

eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law[.]
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
41. SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 25 (quoting
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624).
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concerning the notion of free speech fail to account for the proper
market conditions in which a free interplay of concepts may
expound the principle of one definable truth.4" Holmes' dissent
leaves Sunstein dissatisfied because it offers no indication of
whether "market competition really define[s] truth, or ... lead[s]
to truth, which is independently defined[.] '"3 In a society where
the definition of truth is left up to idiosyncratic realities, Sunstein
maintains that "[t]here can be no assurance of freedom in a system
committed to the 'Daily Me."'"
Indeed, Sunstein's preference-and the foundation to his
theoretical construct-is a romantic notion of an independently
defined truth.45
Instead of a Holmesian view of the First
Amendment, Sunstein argues that the better interpretation of
First Amendment rhetoric is Justice Brandeis' "civic conception of
free speech" espoused in his concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California." Sunstein argues that the Brandeis model of free
speech, which identifies public discussion and political activism as
civic duties necessary to bring about the deliberative forces of
government,47 can be thought of as distinctly Madisonian.
Moreover, Sunstein argues that when carried to its logical end, the
Brandeis' conception of free speech arrives at a markedly different
conclusion than would Holmes' open market conception. 49 Thus,
42. Id. at 26. Sunstein maintains that this failure to delineate favorable
speech market conditions is indicative of Holmes' skepticism concerning truth,
itself. Id.
43. Id. at 25.
44. CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 50 (2001).

45. See SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 26-28
(contrasting Holmes' "pluralism" against Brandeis' conception of civic virtue).
46. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see SUNSTEIN, THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 26-27 (quoting Justice Brandeis'
concurring opinion in Whitney). In his opinion, Justice Brandeis maintained
that:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
They valued liberty both as an end and a means. They believed liberty
to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.
They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile;
that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace
to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty;
and that this should be a fundamental principle of American
government.

Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
47. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375; SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH, supra note 7, at 27-28.
48. See SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 28.
49. Id. Sunstein argues that although Holmes and Brandeis are often
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under the banners of Madisonian politics and Brandeisian speech,
Sunstein blithely professes his theory of how to square free speech
with republican ideals.
2. Squaring the Circle: The New Deal for Speech
In order to align free speech analysis with the First
Amendment's core Madisonian goals and achieve progressive
social reformation, Sunstein envisions that various measures and
regulations which might compromise the popular free speech
principle-or even amount to flat out censorship-actually
promote the public deliberation and the social good. 0 In order to
9achieve a Madisonian conception of free speech, Sunstein
proposes that what is needed is a sort of "New Deal for speech.""
Sunstein analogizes the current state of free speech
conception with the type of constitutional analysis in place prior to
the New Deal. Sunstein states that:
Before the New Deal, the Constitution was often understood as a
constraint on government "regulation" ... In practice, this
understanding meant that the Constitution frequently prohibited
[the] government from interfering with existing distributions of
rights and entitlements. Hence minimum wage and maximum hour
laws ... were invalidated ... as unjustifiable [constitutional]
exactions .... ,,52
Indeed, constitutional analysis was defined to prevent
governmental interference with these systems of distribution.
"Government action was understood as interference with [these
distributions].
The rallying cry 'laissez-faire' captured such
ideas."" However, Sunstein maintains that the Great Depression
revealed the problems with this thinking and Roosevelt's New
Deal attempt to reform from the ground up. Thus, in the New
Deal period of the 1930s, the unregulated market conflicted with
constitutional goals, and the result was that from the zenith of
this conflict, New Dealers
substantively
reformed the
constitutional framework to allow for increased regulatory agency
power and a stronger national government.54
ranked together as "free speech heroes," their "alliance" could only exist "when
[the] government tries to suppress political dissent;" however, if the
government were to suppress the speech marketplace in order to promote
public issues, then "[tlhe two would be antagonists, not allies." Id.
50. Id. at xix.
51. See id. at 28-34 (analogizing the need to make substantive progressive
cultural reformation to the reform instituted under Roosevelt's highly
centralized New Deal).
52. Id. at 29 (citing Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) and
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
53. SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 29.

54. Id. at 29.
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Sunstein maintains that the New Deal period transformed
constitutional thought altogether.
Instead of harboring the
fundamental premise that the Constitution existed as a shield to
protect against governmental regulation, "New Deal reformers
argued that this entire framework [the shield construct] was built
on fictions." 5
Thus, Sunstein looks to President Roosevelt's
argument favoring social security legislation (i.e., that economic
laws are not built by nature but by man) and posits that the
government is always involved in the regulation of free speech:
Laws underlay markets and made them possible. If they had good
reason for doing so, people might change those markets and existing
distributions .... The notion of "laissez-faire" thus stood revealed
as a conspicuous fiction. In a system of free markets, government
did not leave everything alone. It allocated
rights of property; it
56
decided on the law of contract and tort.
American free speech jurisprudence has failed to seriously
consider a New Deal-style reformation.57 Specifically, he asserts
that modern free speech analysis fails to pay enough attention to
"the real purposes of the protection of free speech-its roots in the
Madisonian conception of sovereignty, its concern to bring about
broad deliberation, including attention to public issues and to
diverse views."58 Indeed, in his recent writings, Sunstein has
observed that the self-interest of groups and, more critically, of
individuals at large has led to a schizoid vision of the collective
American conscious. 9 Instead of a collective conscious based on
shared experiences, modern society, as evidenced through
technology
and the
digital
generation,
faces
extreme
fragmentation
where
people
make
their
affirmations
to
"the
Daily
,6
Me.

55. Id. at 30.
56. Id. at 30-31.
57. See id. at 34.
58. See SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 35.
59. See SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM, supra note 44, at 9 (2001) (discussing

how patronage to self-interest threatens the "social glue" of a well-functioning
democracy by undermining the collective, shared experiences of society).
60. Id. at 3-22 (discussing Sunstein's conception of the "Daily Me").

Sunstein maintains that the concept of the "Daily Me" is rooted in the modern
individual's ability to "filter" out general interest in favor of being able to see
exactly what he or she wants to see, and nothing more. Id. at 3. Thus, one
can restrict what they want to see to a particular point of view. Id. at 4. Of

course, the result of such informational isolation is cultural extremism and
fragmentation. Id. at 65-72. Moreover, Sunstein contends that modern
technology provides the basis to expand this fragmentation. Id. at 58.
Specifically, Sunstein looks to politically based Internet web sites to
demonstrate the isolationism and fragmentation advanced by technology. Id.
at 59-60. Indeed, Sunstein observes that very few sites provided links to the
political opposition. Id. at 59. The result of this polarization is that moderateleaning individuals will only strengthen their already held beliefs and
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Consequently, Sunstein maintains that we tend to conceive of
governmental interaction of speech through a "pre-New Deal" lens;
governmental interaction is an "intrinsic evil to be eradicated
through constitutional law."" Sunstein argues that instead of
viewing interaction as inherently counterproductive, we must
explore it to see whether it serves or disserves Madisonian goals
because "at a minimum, what seems to be government regulation
of speech might, in some circumstances, promote free speech as
understood through the democratic conception associated with
both Madison and Brandeis.""
3.

Two-Tiered Approach: Politicaland Nonpolitical Speech

To effectuate this theory, Sunstein argues that restrictions on
some kinds of speech are appropriate and perhaps even necessary
to promote Madisonian free speech.63 Thus, what is needed to
achieve this conception of free speech is restraint: both private
restraint of industries (i.e., unrelated to governmental
action/interaction64) and governmental restraint supported by
legitimate "purposes and effects."65
Where the government

"[w]henever group discussion tends to lead people to more strongly held
versions of the same view with which they began, there is legitimate reason
for concern." Id. at 77. Sunstein contends that the modern conception of
American sovereignty is caught in political tension between two strands of
thought he terms "consumer sovereignty" and "political sovereignty":
Consumer sovereignty means that individual consumers are permitted
to choose as they wish, subject to the constraints provided by the price
system, and also by their current holdings and requirements. This idea
plays a significant role in thinking not only about economic markets, but
also about both politics and communications.

Id. at 45.
In contrast, political sovereignty "does not take individual tastes as
fixed or given. It prizes democratic self-government, understood as a
requirement of 'government by discussion,' accompanied by reason-giving in
the public domain." Id.
61. SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 35.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 43. Sunstein notes that some regulatory efforts, like allowing
political candidates to have free airtime on network television, might actually
promote free speech. Id. However, as Sunstein correctly identifies, the only
way that we will know whether a specific speech regulation impermissibly
restrains speech will be to examine and understand the purposes and
consequences of the regulation. Id.
64. Id. at 36-37 (discussing self-imposed regulation of speech by private
industry, a concept not implicating the First Amendment's charge against
governmental restrictions on free speech). Although my concern is with
governmental regulation of speech, it is noteworthy that Sunstein goes to
great length to repeatedly mention that privatized curtailment of speech
would not give rise to First Amendment concern. Id.
65. Id. at 37 (suggesting that the governmental restrictions on free speech
"should not be invalidated if their purposes and effects are constitutionally
valid, even if they conspicuously intrude on the rights of some property owners
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attempts to regulate specific forms of speech, Sunstein argues that
what is needed is a two-tier approach to the First Amendment.66
These two tiers are defined according to their "constitutional
value" or their ability to promote the underlying core goals of the
First Amendment."
Thus, Sunstein conceives of the two-tier
system as having relatively simple structure: "[d]oes the speech at
issue fall inside the constitutional core? If so, it can be regulated
only on the gravest showing of harm .... If not, it can be regulated
by an invocation of legitimate, sufficiently weighty reasons."68
Thus, speech that has a Madisonian content amounts to political
speech, and everything else belongs to the lower tier.
Sunstein defines the top tier, political speech, as speech that
"is both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue."9 According to Balkin, Sunstein
defines public deliberation to include "'social norms' as well as
changes in the law or government.""0 The broad scope of the upper
tier of speech, then, is that speech which touches on issues of
genuine public interest and political concern.' However, Sunstein
argues that this definition has limits: "Ibloth intent and receipt
must be shown."" According to Sunstein, once the speech falls into

and even some speakers").
66. SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 122.
67. Id. Sunstein's conception of constitutional value is to ask whether the
speech in question is concerned with democratic deliberation and the
Madisonian goals of popular sovereignty. Id. This political conception of the
First Amendment self-consciously owes homage to the thought of Alexander
Meiklejohn. See id. (noting that a conception that "nonpolitical speech...
receives less stringent protection" was vigorously asserted by Meiklejohn).
68. Id. at 123-24.
69. Id. at 130 (italics in original).
70. See Balkin, supra note 21, at 1959; SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH, supra note 7, at 130-31. This definition of political speech, according
to Balkin, is an attempt to solve Meiklejohn's problem of trying to explain
"why nonpolitical expression like art, music, and literature receive a high level
of protection." See Balkin, supra note 21, at 1958. Balkin distinguishes
Meiklejohn from Sunstein by observing that for Meiklejohn, these nonpolitical
forms of expression were intricately tied "to the actual processes of selfgovernance," whereas for Sunstein, they "help individuals deliberate on the
social norms generally." Id. at 1960.
71. See SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 152
(noting that his definition of political speech is broad enough to encompass
"not simply political tracts, but all art and literature that have the
characteristics of social commentary"). In this way, art and literature are
political because they harbor political content. Id. at 153. However, Sunstein
maintains that speech that only carries political consequences, such as
obscenity, hate speech directed at an individual, and commercial speech, does
not amount to political speech. Id. at 153-54.
72. Id. at 131. Sunstein clarifies the proposition that the speech must be
intended and received as political by noting that not all people must see the
political content; it is sufficient if only a few readers or listeners see the
political content of the speech in question. Id. Nonetheless, Sunstein seems to
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the political speech category, then the speech may only be
regulated under the "strongest showing of harm.""
These
stringent requirements are needed because when the government
regulates top-tier speech, it is "biased or... acting on the basis of
illegitimate, venal, or partial considerations.
Government is
rightly distrusted when it is regulating speech that might harm its
own interests; and when the speech at issue is political, its own
interests are almost always at stake."74
The harder case, in contrast, is Sunstein's second tier of
speech, where even he admits that "[there is a hard problem of
definition here." 7' Thus, he maintains that a line must be drawn
between political and nonpolitical speech." This being said, a
significant spectrum of speech must necessarily be excluded from
top-tier protections77 and may be curtailed on a showing of a
legitimate and important purpose.7 ' Although Sunstein maintains
that the fact that the speech may offend does not amount to a
permissible governmental justification, he nonetheless notes that79
it was a sufficient justification for the zoning of adult theatres.
Sunstein goes on to equivocally state that:
Perhaps we can conclude from this that offense at the
ideas is always unacceptable and that offense at the
expressing ideas will be unacceptable (a) when the
political or (b) when there is some basis to believe
government is trying to suppress a viewpoint. °

content of
means of
speech is
that [the]

Despite this distinction, Sunstein suggests that when the
government finds that the speech produces substantial "realworld" harm, it has the power to regulate or exclude certain forms

limit even this expansive proviso by stating that "if some people understand
the speech in question to be political, it cannot follow that the speech qualifies
as such for constitutional purposes, without treating almost all speech as

political and therefore destroying the whole point of the two-tier system." Id.
at 132.
73. Id. at 123.
74. Id. at 134.
75. Id. at 148.
76. SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 149.
Sunstein notes that there is some aversion to the process of line drawing
because we are never entirely certain as to who is drawing the lines. Id.
However, he maintains that there are really two issues to consider: (1)

"whether the relevant distinction is plausible in principle and administrable in
practice ...

[and (2)] whether alternative systems are better."

Id. at 150.

Sunstein maintains that if his Madisonian conception of speech fares well with
these considerations-and, by implication, they must because he is raising the
theory in the first place-then the risks attendant with line drawing are

acceptable. Id.
77. See id. at 154.
78. Id. at 124.
79. See id. at 157.
80. Id.
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of speech that are associated with these harms.8
At bottom, Sunstein's civic republican approach to free speech
largely values the speech of "We the People," but allows the
economic, common, and otherwise vernacular speech to be subject
to governmental imposition where the government can show that
the speech results in harm. Under his conception of free speech,
such a showing of harm need not even be related to the speech in
order to suppress the form of expression.
Still, Sunstein's approach should not seem foreign.
His
theoretical framework is intimately rooted in and related to
current First Amendment analysis, especially regarding the
secondary effects doctrine.
II.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CONTENT DISCRIMINATION

A. Introduction to FirstAmendment Analysis
Today, First Amendment doctrine represents a cavernous
embodiment of conflicting rules and judicial viewpoints. 2
Understanding a general theory of free speech is a protean battle,'
and, indeed, some commentators suggest that, in practice, it boils
down to little more than simple ad hoc balancing.'
Although

81. SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 164.
Sunstein specifically speaks of nude dancing, which may be associated with
such "real-world harm" as prostitution, criminal activity, and sexual assault.
Id.
82. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (stating
that "[e]ach method of communicating ideas is a 'law unto itself and that law
must reflect the 'differing natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each
method").
83. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE 9, 13 (1990) (noting that First Amendment jurisprudence represents
"an endless maze" with "no general framework"). For a critique of efforts to
construct a general theory of the First Amendment, see ROBERT NAGEL,
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 29-35 (1989) (critiquing the efforts of First Amendment
scholars in formulating general free speech theories); Lawrence A. Alexander
& Paul Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech Principle,78 NW. U. L. REV.
1319, 1320 (1983) (arguing that a general theory of free speech doctrine is
inconceivable because of the inherent complexity of the law); Steven H.
Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1215-16
(1983) (maintaining that where regulation is aimed at effecting commercial
speech, a general theory of free expression fails to provide adequate
consideration); Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content
Discrimination,68 VA. L. REV. 203, 207 (stating that "[o]ne would err to speak
of [F]irst [A]mendment doctrine as if a well-defined consensus existed about
the principles underlying [F]irst [Almendment analysis"); Laurence H. Tribe,
Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 SW. U. L. REV. 237, 237 (1978)
(recognizing the difficulties in articulating a general theory of free expression).
84. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 39 (1992)
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there are various principles of free speech analysis like
doctrine,86
and
content
public
forum
categorization,"5
discrimination," perhaps the most pervasive principle is content
discrimination.8
1.

Content Discrimination

Under the content discrimination methodology, laws that
regulate speech are distinguished based on the degree they
regulate the content of speech. Under this test, the courts
examine the governmental motivation or purpose in order to
determine the regulation's impact on expression.89 Laws that
(arguing that in resolving a First Amendment conflict, one of the most
seductive theories of interpretation is the ad hoc balancing test in which "the
weight of the speech interest is balanced against the weight of the competing
interest, and the conflict is resolved under a straightforward costlbenefit
analysis"). Because both expression and the societal interests are afforded
varying weights of importance and protection, Smolla recognizes that this "ad
hoc balancing" test "fluctuates with the circumstances, requiring a case-bycase evaluation of the value of the speech threatened by the governmental
regulation." Id.
85. Categorization is a principle of analysis that is based on the type of
speech involved. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court wrote
that:
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those that
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of peace.
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
Moreover, some speech, such as political speech, receives the highest
level of protection, whereas other speech, like commercial speech, is entitled to
less. Compare Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (arguing that only political speech should
receive constitutional protection), with LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-18 (2d ed. 1988) (characterizing the commercial
speech doctrine as "intermediate categories").
86. The public forum doctrine is a method of free speech analysis that
examines speech based on where the speech takes place. The Supreme Court
held that certain places like public streets and parks "have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions." Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,
515 (1939).
87. Content discrimination is a method of free speech analysis that
examines the degree to which the governmental regulation impacts the
speech.
88. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
46, 55-56 (discussing the content-based/content-neutral distinction and the
long standing principle that the "government may not restrict speech because
it disapproves of a particular message").
89. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989)
(upholding New York City's sound amplification guidelines where the same

The John Marshall Law Review

[35:189

directly regulate the content of speech are termed content-based
restrictions; laws that regulate without regard to content are
called content-neutral restrictions." While some scholars have
criticized content distinction, 9' it is the predominant test favored
by the Supreme Court, and, in the words of Justice O'Connor,
perhaps "no better alternative has yet come to light.""
a.

Content-Based Regulations

Content-based regulations target expression precisely
because of the ideas conveyed by the speech.93 Even when the
communication in question is not speech per se but is a symbolic
form of expression, governmental regulations that restrict the
expressive elements of the speech face a heavy challenge as a
content-based restriction.94 Content-based restrictions frequently

were used to require concert promoters to use the city's sound equipment).
90. Hudson, supra note 13, at 57.
91. After all, the determination as to whether a law "is content based or
content neutral is not always a simple task." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC,

512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
92. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
93. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 643 ("[a]s a general rule, laws that by
their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of
the ideas or views expressed are content-based."). See also Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (holding that a statute banning signs critical of foreign
governments within 500 feet of respective embassies was a content-based
restriction on speech); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123,
134 (1992) (finding that "[1]istener's reaction to speech is not a content-neutral
basis for regulation"); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984) (stating
that "[riegulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis
of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First
Amendment"); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867-68 (1997) (holding that a
prohibition of the transmission of indecent communications over the Internet
to persons under eighteen was a restriction on speech because of the
expressive elements of the communication); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115-117
(1991) (finding that a statute imposing a financial burden on speakers is
presumptively content-based). Additionally, a legislature cannot proscribe a
part of the expression that it finds disagreeable. See Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 24-26 (1971) (holding that the defendant's jacket stating "Fuck the
Draft" was not obscene and was protected under the First amendment). The
Court stated:
The constitutional right of free expression is ...

intended to remove

governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each
of us ...

in the belief that no other approach would comport with the

premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system
rests.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
94. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (finding that a Texas
regulation prohibiting the desecration of a flag discriminated against the
expressive elements involved in such conduct). In Johnson, the authorities
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violate the First Amendment,95 not because they impact speech but
because the government intends to restrict the actual content of
the idea contained in the speech.96 As such, a content-based
restriction will only be upheld if it advances a compelling
97
governmental interest in the least restrictive means.
b.

Content-Neutral Restrictions

Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, curtail
speech through the conduct or context of the expression, not the
ideas expressed. 98 As Rodney Smolla notes, a purely contentneutral restriction has "nothing to do with the message, only the
mode. It is not what is said that is at issue, but where and how

arrested Johnson, who, in a political demonstration protesting the policies of
Ronald Reagan, by burning an American flag in front of the Dallas City Hall
and chanting "'America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you.'" Id. at 399.
The trial court convicted Johnson of violating a "Desecration of Venerated
Object" statute that specifically prohibited damaging the national flag. Id. at
400. The Supreme Court found that the statute violated the First Amendment
as a content-based regulation that was not narrowly drawn to serve a
compelling governmental interest. Id. at 409-10. The Court justified its
holding, stating: "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Id.
at 414.
95. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (stating,
"[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid").
96. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (discussing
obscenity, the Court stated that "[a]ll ideas having even the slightest
redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of
the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach on the limited area of
more important interests").
97. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
(maintaining that content-based restrictions are permissible "in order to
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to
further the articulated interest").
98. See generally United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968)
(upholding a regulation prohibiting the knowing destruction of a draft card);
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984)
(upholding a regulation by the National Parks Service banning sleeping in
public parks). Additionally, other content-neutral regulations concern the
context of the expression, such as the time, place, and manner of the speech.
See generally Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776
(1994) (upholding an injunction that created a "36 foot buffer-zone" around a
health clinic from anti-abortion protestors); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (upholding a regulation on the volume of music performed
in a public park based on permissive time, place, and manner restrictions);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976) (upholding
a zoning ordinance prohibiting an adult movie theater or bookstore located
within 1000 feet of any other like establishment and at lest 500 feet from any
residential areas);
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loud."99 The two basic methods for analyzing content-neutral
regulations 0 are the "time, place and manner test"10' and the
O'Brien test, which applies to restrictions on "symbolic speech" or
incidental regulations. 2 However, despite the distinction between
these tests, the Supreme Court has held that, for all intents
purposes, the tests are identical.10° A content-neutral regulation
99. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY, supra note 84, at 54.
100. It should be noted that Professor Stone has identified at least seven
different tests for a content-neutral analysis. See Stone, supra note 88, at 4850. Two of the seven tests he identifies are the "time, place, and manner" test
and the "'O'Brientest."' Id. at 51.
101. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). Under
the time, place, and manner test, content-neutral restrictions will be upheld if
"they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication." Renton, 475 U.S.
at 47.
102. The O'Brien test arose out of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1967). In O'Brien, David Paul O'Brien burned his draft card on the steps of
the South Boston Courthouse to encourage others to adopt his anti-war beliefs.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369. The authorities arrested O'Brien and convicted him
of violation a criminal statute prohibiting the knowing destruction or
mutilation of a Selective Services Certificate (draft card). Id. at 369-70. The
Supreme Court found that although this conduct amounted to speech within
the parameters of the First Amendment, the statute was constitutional
because it satisfied the four-part test for content-neutrality. Id. at 378-83. The
Supreme Court rejected O'Brien's First Amendment argument and set out a
four-prong test to be used when speech and nonspeech elements are combined
in the same activity. Id. at 376. The Court found that:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
The pivotal loci for the O'Brien test rest with the determination of two
issues: (1) whether the governmental interest is important or substantial, and
(2) whether the governmental interest relates to the suppression of the free
expression in question. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON

FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 9:4 (1998) (maintaining that the
of O'Brien rests with the determination of whether the
involved is unrelated to the content of the expression).
argues that the Court in O'Brien misapplied its own

most important prong
governmental interest
Moreover, Smolla also
test. See 1 SMOLLA,

SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra, at § 9:5 (arguing that

the Court's assertion of the governmental interests asserted were simply too
trivial to find them to be both important and unrelated to the suppression of
free expression). Smolla contends that the O'Brien Court was "less than fully
candid in its reading of the legislative history" because Congress "openly
declared that its real reason for passing the law [was] to stifle dissenters from
burning their draft cards as a means of persuading others to resist the draft
and the war effort." Id. In this way, the O'Brien test challenges the very
quality of the governmental interest involved in the regulation. See O'Brien,
391 U.S. at 376.
103. See Clark 468 U.S. at 298 (maintaining that there is "little, if any,"
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has a better chance of withstanding constitutional scrutiny than
However, sometimes (and
does a content-based restriction. °4
perhaps often) "a seemingly content-neutral regulation of speech is
promulgated to disguise the true purpose of insidious
This is the very problem encountered with the
censorship."' '
secondary effects doctrine since it reduces the level of scrutiny of a
content-based regulation to that of a content-neutral regulation.
III THE SECONDARY EFFECTS DOCTRINE
Under the secondary effects doctrine, a seemingly contentbased law-one that targets only one type of speech'o-is analyzed
as a content-neutral law if the regulation of speech is 'justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech."' °7 Thus,
where the governmental purpose is to prevent or reduce the
negative secondary effects associated with certain types of speech,
the level of constitutional protection for speech is reduced from
0
In effect, this test blurs
strict scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny."
the distinctions between content discrimination and speech
categorization. For this reason, the doctrine, as discussed infra, is
frequently used as a powerful tool in regulating adult
entertainment and presents the potential for further expansion.
Although the secondary effects doctrine originated out of cases
concerning the zoning of "adult entertainment" establishments
like adult bookstores, adult movie theatres, and exotic dance
clubs,"° it has expanded to include non-zoning regulations and has
even been applied to situations not dealing with adult
entertainment at all. This section discusses both the history and
the continued scope of the doctrine's application.

difference between the standard applied for expressive conduct and the time,
place, and manner standard); Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 (same).

104. See Hudson, supra note 13, at 60.
105. Id.
106. See Stone, supra note 88, at 115-17 (maintaining that regulations which
single out one type of speech have the semblance of content-based laws).
107. City of Renton v. Playtime Theater, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986). (italics

in original).
108. Hudson, supra note 13, at 60. Hudson also notes that the secondary
effects doctrine also "waters down the level of constitutional for speech
affected by a genuinely content-neutral law." Id.
109. See 1 SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra

note 102, at § 9:18 (noting that municipalities frequently attempt to control
sexually oriented forms of expression through zoning ordinances). Smolla
notes that because municipalities frequently target only one type of
expression, "'adult entertainment,'" that this type of regulation appears to be

content-based on its face. Id.
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A. The History of the Secondary Effects Doctrine
1.

Zoning Adult Entertainment

The genesis of the doctrine lay in a footnote in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc."' In Young, Detroit amended an
"anti-skid row ordinance" to place zoning limitations on adult
Under this ordinance, the Detroit City Council
businesses."
sought to disperse red light areas by preventing adult businesses
from being located within 1,000 feet from any existing adult
business and 500 feet from any residential area."'
The Supreme Court, addressing a First Amendment challenge
by two adult businesses, determined that the zoning ordinance
was not passed to silence speech but was passed to prevent
neighborhoods from deteriorating." 3 Justice Stevens, writing for
the plurality, wrote:
The Common Council's determination was that a concentration of
"adult" movie theatres causes the area to become a focus of crime,
effects which are not attributable to theatres showing other types of
films. It is this secondary effect that these zoning ordinances
4
attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of "offensive" speech.1
Although the Court recognized that the ordinance classified
the films based on their content,"' it nonetheless found that such a
classification did not violate the government's duty of neutrality
because the regulation did not restrict a particular "social,
political, or philosophical message... [or] point of view."" 6
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of the secondary
effects doctrine and expanded its scope in City of Renton v.
City of Renton concerned another
Playtime Theatres, Inc."7
constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance which affected adult
entertainment establishments in the City of Renton, Washington,
a suburb of Seattle." 8 The ordinance in question, like Young,
prohibited locating adult movie theatres within 1,000 feet of any
residential zone, single- and multiple-family dwelling, church,
110. 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976). See also Hudson, supra note 13, at 61;
Robert Post, Recuperating FirstAmendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249,

1265 n.77 (1995).
111. Young, 427 U.S. at 54.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 70-72.
114. Id. at 71 n.34.
115. Id. at 70-71 (holding "that the [s]tate may legitimately use the content

of these materials as the basis for placing them in a different classification
from other motion pictures").
116. Young, 427 U.S. at 70. Commentators like David Hudson suggest that
the Court effectively substituted "'viewpoint-neutrality' for "'contentneutrality."' Hudson, supra note 13, at 62.
117. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
118. Id. at 43. Specifically, the ordinance targeted adult movie theatres. Id.
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park, or school.'19 The ordinance excluded 94% of the land in the
city from use by adult entertainment establishments.12' In effect,
adult entertainment establishments into
the ordinance zoned
121
complete extinction.

The Supreme Court, relying on Young,122 found that although
the ordinance singled out adult movie theatres over other types of
theatres, it was a content-neutral regulation because its
predominate concerns were with the secondary effects of adult
theatres rather than the content of films.

23

The Court stated:

At first glance, the Renton ordinance, like the ordinance in
American Mini Theatres, does not appear to neatly fit into either the
"content-based" or the "content-neutral" category. To be sure, the
ordinance treats theatres that specialize in adult films differently
from other types of theatres. Nevertheless

....

[the] City Council's

"predominate concerns" were with the secondary effects of adult
24
theatres, and not with the content of the adult films themselves.
The city maintained-and the Court agreed-that these
theaters facilitated secondary effects such as increased crime,
injury to retail trade, damage to property values, and the general
deterioration in neighborhood quality. 2' The Court found that the
ordinance was "completely consistent with our definition of
'content-neutral' speech regulations,"12 ' because it was 'justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech."" 7
Furthermore, the Court maintained that the City of Renton need
The ordinance in question, as originally enacted,
119. Id. at 44-45.
prohibited adult establishments from being located within a mile of any
school; however, after the plaintiffs brought suit, the City Council reduced this
distance to 1,000 feet. Id.
120. See 1 SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra

note 102, § 9:19, at 9-29. Smolla notes that, of the remaining 520 acres of
space available, "a substantial part was occupied by a sewage disposal and
treatment plant, a horse racing track, a warehouse and manufacturing
facilities [sic], a Mobil Oil tank farm, and a fully developed shopping center."
Id. (citing City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 53-54).
121. See id. (stating that "[tihe city had thus, as a practical matter, largely
zoned adult theatres out of existence").
122. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters,,Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986) (stating
that "the resolution of this case is largely dictated by our decision in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc.").
123. Id. at 47-48.
124. Id. at 47. (emphasis in original). But see id. at 58-59 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the City Council's entire secondary effects justification
was added in an amendment to the ordinance made after the lawsuit was
filed).
125. Id. at 48. The Court also maintained that even if one of the motivating
factors had been invalid, the existence of an improper motive will not lead to
striking down an otherwise constitutional statute. Id. at 47-48 (citing O'Brien,
391 U.S. at 382-86).
126. Id. at 48.
127. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 48. (emphasis in original).
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not investigate the effects of these establishments, but could
instead rely on the findings of nearby Seattle.128 Thus, the Court
found that the Renton ordinance survived content-neutral
intermediate scrutiny because it was "designed to serve a
substantial governmental interest and do[es] not unreasonably
limit alternative avenues of communication."129
2. Non-Zoning Regulations on Adult Entertainment: Barnes v.

Glenn Theatre, Inc. & City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.
Although Young and City of Renton involved the zoning of
adult entertainment establishments, the Supreme Court has
applied the secondary effects doctrine to regulations more
centrally tied to the nature of the expression.
Indeed Barnes v. Glenn Theatre, Inc.13' did not involve a
zoning regulation, rather, at issue was an Indiana public
indecency statute which proscribed public nudity across the board
and prescribed that, at a minimum, a woman must wear a Gstring and pasties.' A plurality of the Court analyzed the statute
under the O'Brien test for content-neutral regulations on
expressive conduct. The plurality found that the regulation was
not aimed at restricting expression-the erotic message conveyed
by nude
dancers-but was intended to "protect morals and public
, 132
order.

128. Id. at 50-51.

129. Id. at 47. Courts have applied the secondary effects doctrine to the
zoning of adult establishments where the statute does not identify a particular
adult industry but instead targets "sexually oriented businesses." See Z.J.
Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 685 (10th Cir. 1998). In Z.J.
Gifts, a suburb of Denver enacted an ordinance which required all sexually
oriented businesses to be located in industrial zones and prohibited them from
being located within 1,500 feet of any church, school, residential areas, public
parks, or other sexually oriented businesses. Id. Z.J. Gifts did not provide
any on site nude entertainment but nearly sold sexually oriented material to
be viewed at home. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit sustained
the regulation relying on City of Renton's secondary effects rationale. Id. at
687.
130. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
131. Id. at 563 (Rehnquist, J.). It should be noted that the law was
seemingly discriminatorily enforced. The dissenting Justices noted that not
all nude dancing was prohibited, only the barroom style nude dancing as
performed in adult entertainment establishments, not theatrical presentations
of plays. Id. at 590 (White, Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
132. Id. at 569. As such, requiring the dancers to wear G-strings and pasties
did not deprive the dance of the message, but "simply ma[de] the message
slightly less graphic." Id. at 571. But see 1 SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 102, § 9:14, at 9-16 (maintaining that "[iut
was telling that the principal cases cited by the Chief Justice for this
proposition involved obscenity, which the Court had long before ruled was not
constitutionally protected speech-and homosexual sodomy-which the Court
had previously held could be outlawed by government").
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Justice Souter's concurring opinion provided the fifth vote
needed to uphold the statute. Relying on the secondary effects
doctrine, Justice Souter maintained that the law was a contentneutral proscription of the expressive or symbolic speech. 3 ' Souter
wrote:
I nonetheless write separately to rest my concurrence in the
judgment, not on the possible sufficiency of society's moral views to
justify the limitations at issue, but on the State's substantial
interest in combating the secondary effects of adult entertainment
34
establishments of the sort typified by respondents' establishment.
Although the Indiana legislature never referenced the
secondary effects doctrine when enacting the law, Justice Souter
indicated that the secondary effects doctrine may be used to
regulate speech even when "it is unclear to what extent this
purpose [secondary effects] motivated the Indiana Legislature in
enacting the statute." 3' Indeed, Justice Souter assumed that the
Indiana Legislature considered the secondary effects doctrine
when it enacted the legislation, regardless of whether the
legislature relied on independent research. 36
Despite the fact that only Justice Souter supported the
secondary effects rationale, the Barnes opinion was "helplessly

133. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 582.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 583-84. Souter states: "I do not believe that a [sitate is required
affirmatively to undertake to litigate this issue repeatedly in every case." Id.
at 584. Notwithstanding this flexible evidentiary standard, at least one court
has sought to limit the exceedingly broad evidentiary showing required. In
Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S.Ct. 1223 (2001), the Ninth Circuit invalidated a 1983
amendment to a Los Angeles ordinance because the City failed to carry its
evidentiary burden. The original ordinance, enacted in 1978, zoned "adult
business[es]" at least 1000 feet from another such establishment and 500 feet
from religious institutions, schools, or public parks. Id. at 720. This
ordinance was based on a comprehensive study that found a correlation
between concentrations of adult businesses and heightened crime rates. Id.
However, in 1983, the city redefined "adult entertainment businesses" to
include "adult bookstore" and "adult arcade" as "separate adult businesses"

under the ordinance, without conducting another survey. Id. at 720-21. In
1995, the Alameda bookstore was found to be operating both an adult
bookstore and arcade in the same location, in violation of the 1983
amendment. Id. at 721. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Alameda Books, finding that the city failed to carry its evidentiary
burden because the study it relied on treated multiple use adult businesses as
one adult business. Id. at 724. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district
court and rejected the city's contention that it could also rely on studies
conducted by other cities because there was no evidence that the type of
behavior that would occur in a multiple-use adult business would not be
identical to what occurred in a single-use adult business. Id. at 728. The
Supreme Court heard oral arguments on December 4, 2001.
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fragmented"'37 and understanding it is like "reading... tea
leaves," 38 resulting in many lower courts applying Justice Souter's
secondary effects concurrence. 3 9 The result was that the Supreme
Court revisited its Barnes opinion nine years later in City of Erie
v. Pap'sA.M. 40
In Pap's A.M., a plurality of the Court validated a nearly
identical public indecency regulation' based on the secondary
effects doctrine. Unlike the statute in Barnes, the preamble to the
public indecency ordinance enacted by the City of Erie,
Pennsylvania specifically targeted nude dance and invoked the
secondary effects doctrine as a justification. The preamble stated
that that City Council adopted the regulation:
[Flor the purpose of limiting a recent increase in nude live
entertainment within the City, which activity adversely impacts and
threatens to impact on the public health, safety, and welfare by
providing an atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment,
public intoxication, prostitution, the spread
of sexually transmitted
4
diseases and other deleterious effects.1 2
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the city
43
council had an illicit motive in enacting the ordinance.
137. See Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 278 (Pa. 1998)
(characterizing Barnes as a "fragmented decision"), rev'd 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
138. Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129, 134 (6th Cir. 1994).
139. See, e.g., Triplett Grille, 40 F.3d at 135; Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 674
A.2d 338 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996), rev'd 719 A.2d 273, 278 (Pa. 1998), rev'd City
of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); J & B Entm't, Inc. v. City of
Jackson, 152 F.3d 362, 373-75 n.7 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding statute banning
public nudity, except for those persons expressing a matter of "serious artistic,
literary, political, or scientific expression," on the basis of the negative
secondary effects doctrine); Farkas v. Miller, 151 F.3d 900, 903-05 (8th Cir.
1998) (upholding a statute banning the exposure of genitals or the female
breast by entertainers); International Eateries of America, Inc. v. Broward
County, 941 F.2d 1157, 1161 (11th Cir. 1997); D'Angio v. Borough of
Nescopeck, 56 F. Supp. 2d 502, 505 (M.D. Pa. 1999).
140. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
141. Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. at 302. Although both the public indecency statute
in Barnes and Pap's A.M. banned nudity in public, it should be noted that the
City of Erie defined nudity in a specialized way. Justice Stevens, in his
dissent, highlights the distinctions:
In Barnes, the statute defined "nudity" as "the showing of the human
male or female genitals... with less than fully opaque covering."...
The Erie ordinance duplicates that definition in all material respects,
but adds the following to its definition of "nudity": "[Tihe exposure of
any device, costume, or covering which gives the appearance of or

simulates the genitals, pubic hair, natal cleft, perineum anal region or
pubic hair region; or the exposure of any device worn as a cover over the
nipples and/or areola of the female breast, which device simulates and
gives the realisticappearanceof nipples and/or areola."

Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. at 330-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). (emphasis in original).
142. Id. at 290.
143. Id. at 291-92. The respondent adult entertainment establishment,
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Moreover, the Court maintained that although the preamble
specifically identified nude live entertainment as the targeted
expression, the ordinance was content-neutral because it "[did] not
attempt to regulate the primary effects of the expression, i.e., the
effect on the audience of watching nude erotic dancing, but rather
the secondary effects. . .

."'"

Having found the regulation to be

content-neutral, the Court summarily analyzed the ordinance
14
under the O'Brien test and found it to be constitutional,
Kandyland, argued that the ordinance targeted nude dance only based on
statements by the city attorney that "the public nudity ban was not intended
to apply to 'legitimate' theater productions." Id. at 292. The Court rejected
this argument, as it did in City of Renton, by invoking the statement from
O'Brien that the Court will not "strike down an otherwise constitutional
statute on the basis of an illicit motive." Id.; O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382-83; City
of Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48. However, commentators have argued that this
doctrine in O'Brien is, itself, overbroad.
See TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 85, § 12-5, at 819-20.
144. Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. at 291. The Court analogizes, indeed even directly
links, the secondary effects doctrine to the O'Brien test for content-neutral
incidental effects.
This case is, in fact, similar to O'Brien, Community for the Creative NonViolence, and Ward. The justification for the government regulation in
each case presents harmful "secondary" effects that are unrelated to the
suppression of expression ....
While the doctrinal theories behind
"incidental burdens" and "secondary effects" are, of course, not identical,
there is nothing objectionable about a city passing a general ordinance
to ban public nudity (even though such a ban may place incidental
burdens on some protected speech) and at the same time recognizing
that one specific occurrence of public nudity-nude erotic dancing-is
particularly problematic because it produces harmful secondary effects.
Id. at 294-95.
Also, at least one scholar has claimed that the origin of the secondary
effects doctrine lay with O'Brien itself. See Philip J. Prygoski, The Supreme
Court's "SecondaryEffects" Analysis in Free Speech Cases, 6 COOLEY L. REV. 1,
3-6 (1989) (stating that O'Brien is "the source of the secondary effects
analysis"). It is, of course, open to debate as to whether the Court paid
reverence to this argument, but it seems that the Court certainly endorses the
idea that the secondary effects doctrine and the incidental burden doctrine in
O'Brien amount to a close parallel. The Court noted this parallel in stating
"[i]n that sense, this case [Pap's A.M.] is similar to O'Brien." Pap'sA.M., 529
U.S. at 291.
145. Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. at 302. In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that
the secondary effects doctrine "has grave implications for basic free speech
principles." Id. at 322 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens noted that "[blecause the category of effects that 'happen to be
associated' with speech includes the narrower subset of effects caused by
speech, today's holding has the effect of swallowing whole a most fundamental
principle of First Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 323. Justice Stevens
further states that the plurality's characterization of the effectiveness of the
law in achieving the stated goal is "an enormous understatement" and "[t]o
believe that the mandatory addition of pasties and a G-string will have any
kind of noticeable impact on secondary effects requires nothing short of a
titanic surrender to the implausible." Id. (emphasis in original). However,
Justice Stevens would expressly limit the secondary effects doctrine to limiting
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regardless of the fact that the Erie City Council did not investigate
the effects of public nudity, but simply relied on the Court's
opinion in Barnes.
3.

Expansion Outside of Adult Entertainment

The secondary effects doctrine may have some use outside the
particular arena of adult entertainment.
Although some
commentators question the doctrine's ability to survive outside of
the adult-use environment, 4 7 lower courts and, indeed, legislative
bodies have readily invoked the secondary effects doctrine to
contend with a variety of legislation outside of the adult
entertainment context. Thus, the secondary effects doctrine may
have a place in other arenas like political speech, discriminatory or
hate speech, and commercial speech.
The Supreme Court first indicated a willingness to extend the
the place where such speech could be made-not a specific proscription of the
speech itself. Id. at 324-25. For this reason, he maintains that "[ulntil now,
the 'secondary effects' of
commercial enterprises featuring indecent
entertainment have justified only the regulation of their location [zoning]." Id.
at 317.
Supporting his contention that the City of Erie enacted the regulation
specifically to silence the speech-or effectively eradicate the "immoral"
message conveyed-Justice Stevens examines the legislative history further.
See id. at 318-27. He notes that in addition to the portion of the preamble
quoted by the plurality, it also states that "'the Council of the City of Erie has
[found] ... that certain lewd, immoral activities carried on in public places for
profit.., lead to the debasement of both women and men.. ."' Id. at 327 n.10.
Additionally, "[o]ne lawmaker observed: 'We're not talking about nudity.
We're not talking about the theater or art ... We're talking about what is
indecent and immoral ... We're not prohibiting nudity, we're prohibiting
nudity when it's used in a lewd and immoral fashion.'" Id. at 329.
146. Id. at 301. But see id. at 310-315 (Souter, J., concurring and dissenting
in part) (maintaining that the evidentiary showing of secondary effects was
not sufficiently based on the facts of the case).
147. See 1 SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra

note 102, §§ 9:20 and 9:21 (maintaining that the City of Renton secondary
effects doctrine may be limited to the special case of sexually oriented
expression). Smolla argues that Justice Souter's invocation of the doctrine in
his concurring opinion in Barnes may justify this view of a special adult
entertainment jurisprudence because Justice Souter maintained that Barnes
was similar to other cases that limited adult content. Id. at § 9:21. See also
Susan H. Williams, Content Discriminationand the First Amendment, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 615, 632-33 (1991) (noting that "[t]he question remaining is
whether the Court will extend the secondary effects approach to facially
content-based regulations affecting "higher' value speech..."). However,
Smolla's argument fails to consider the Pap's A.M. plurality's conflagration of
secondary effects with traditional incidental burdens cases like O'Brien, Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, and Ward v. Rock Against Racismnone of which dealt with "adult entertainment." To the extent that the
Supreme Court is willing to equate the secondary effects doctrine with the
O'Brien test for content-neutral regulations on symbolic expression, Smolla's
delimitation may not prove accurate.
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doctrine beyond adult entertainment in Boos v. Barry's by
legitimately considering its application to a prohibition on political
speech.'
There, the Court invalidated a District of Columbia law
that prohibited the display of signs critical of foreign governments
within 500 feet of their respective embassy."' When challenged by
persons wanting to protest the Soviet Union and Nicaragua by
picketing outside their respective embassies, the government
argued that the law was content-neutral and based on the
secondary effects doctrine. 51 The alleged purpose of the law was to
prevent secondary effects by protecting "our international law
obligation to shield diplomats from speech that offends their
dignity."" 2 Although the United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit upheld the law, relying on City of Renton,"' the
Supreme Court reversed, maintaining that the argument set forth
by the Government "misreads Renton."' The problem with the
law was that the "justification focuses only on the content of the
speech and the direct impact that the speech has on its
listeners.... Listeners' reactions to speech are not the type of
'secondary effects' we referred to in Renton.... [tihe emotive
impact of speech on the audience is not a 'secondary effect'" but is
rather a primary effect."' Thus, although the Supreme Court
struck the regulation for not focusing on the secondary effects, by
considering the doctrine's application to an area outside of adult
entertainment, the Court opened the door to the continued
expansion of the secondary effects doctrine. 6
While many
Supreme Court cases have focused on this Boos distinction," 7 the
148. 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988).
149. See id.

150. Boos, 485 U.S. at 315 (the law provided that: "'[it shall be unlawful to
display any flag, banner, placard, or device designed... [to] bring into public
odium any foreign government ...or to bring into public disrepute political,
social, or economic acts, views, or purposes of any foreign government...').
151. See id. at 319.
152. Id. at 320.
153. See Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1453, 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork,
J.).
154. Boos, 485 U.S. at 320.
155. Id. at 321.
156. See, e.g., id. at 334-35 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment). Justice Brennan wrote, "[t]he Renton analysis, however,
creates a possible avenue for governmental censorship whenever censors can
concoct 'secondary' rationalizations for regulating the content of political
speech." Id. at 335. "Until today, the Renton analysis, however unwise, had at
least never been applied to political speech. Renton itself seemed to confine its
application to 'businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials.'" Id. at 33738.
157. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867-68 (1997) (holding that

the Government's secondary effects argument failed because the purpose of
the regulation, which criminalized the transmission of indecent materials to
children under eighteen over the Internet, was aimed at preventing the
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Court has not expressly limited the application of the doctrine, and
many lower courts have utilized the secondary effects doctrine to
uphold content-based restrictions. 5"
The secondary effects doctrine is also invoked in the context
of discriminatory speech and hate speech.
The use of the
secondary effects doctrine in these areas arose out of the Supreme
Court decision, R.A.V.v. City of St. Paul. 59 In that case, the Court
primary effects rather than the secondary effects); Forsyth County v.
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1995) (finding that "[Ilisteners'
reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation"). See also
Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 854 n.4 (Cal. 1999)
(stating that "'[tihe emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a
,secondary effect').
158. See generally Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1294-96 (2nd Cir.
1996) (finding that governmental restriction on the right of homosexuals in
the military to speak out were incidental to the secondary effect of prohibiting
homosexual conduct); Auburn Police Union v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886, 893 n.9
(1st Cir. 1993) (upholding a ban on police solicitation because it focused on
secondary effects like "the implied coercion inherent in solicitation on behalf of
law enforcement personnel, with the resulting loss of integrity"); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 100 F.3d 175, 185 (1st
Cir. 1996) (upholding a ban on newspaper distribution in order to prevent the
secondary effect of "visual clutter"); Potts v. City of Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106,
1112 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting attendants of a KKK
rally from carrying personal items-including a reporter's tape recorderbecause of the secondary effect that individuals might injure themselves);
Sanjour v. EPA, 786 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 (D. D.C. 1992), rev'd, 984 U.S. 443
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding law prohibiting government employees from being
compensated for unofficial speech because the law was passed to prevent the
negative secondary effect of "the appearance of impropriety"); Nat'l
Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 846 F. Supp. 1023, 1032 (D. Mass.
1994) (upholding prohibition on any licensed entertainment establishment
from operating between 1 a.m. and 6 a.m. to prevent the secondary effects of
late night traffic, noise, and security problems); New York State Ass'n of
Realtors, Inc. v. Shaffer, 833 F. Supp. 165, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (upholding
anti-solicitation law on real estate brokers to prevent the secondary effect of
blockbusting); Presbytery of New Jersey of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church
v. Florio, 902 F. Supp. 492 (D. N.J. 1995), affd on other grounds, 99 F.3d 101
(3d Cir 1996) (upholding a New Jersey law that prohibited discrimination
based on sexual orientation to protect individuals from the secondary effect of
discrimination in employment, public accommodations, and business
transactions); Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996), affd on other grounds, 980 P.2d 846 (Cal. 1999) (upholding
speech specific injunctions to prevent the secondary effect of a discriminatorily
abusive work environment).
159. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). The Court in R.A.V. struck an anti-hate crime
ordinance that punished action that "one knows ... arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." Id.
at 380. The Court found that although the law punishes unprotected speech
under the First Amendment [see Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571 (maintaining
that fighting words have never received the protection of the First
Amendment)], the government could not pass a law that punishes certain
types of fighting words. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380. Identification of such specific
content amounted to an impermissible content distinction. Id.
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held that although some speech, such as fighting words (or hate
speech), may be proscribed because it does not invoke First
Amendment protections, prohibiting specific words amounted to
impermissible content discrimination. 6 ° Nonetheless, the majority
noted three exceptions to this general rule, which included the
secondary effects doctrine. 161 In this way, a "valid basis for
according differential treatment to even a content-defined subclass
of proscribable speech is that the subclass happens to be
' 62
'
associated with particular 'secondary effects. ""
Lower courts have taken up the secondary effects gauntlet
from R.A.V.. For example, in California, the secondary effects
doctrine was invoked in a case concerning speech specific
injunctions prohibiting racially harassing speech in the
workplace.'63 However, the Supreme Court of California rejected
this argument, noting that enjoining certain racial epithets to
protect an individual from upset does not amount to a secondary
effect of speech, but rather a primary effect of the speech.'6
IV.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

Civic

REPUBLICANISM AND THE

SECONDARY EFFECTS DOCTRINE

The correlation between civic republican thought and the
secondary effects rationale appears, on the surface at least,
minimal. However, underlying both theories is a deep connection
based on value preference setting by the government. Indeed,
both theories operate in a similar fashion and take their roots in
republican conceptions of free speech. In their distinct way, each
blurs and bends the differentiation between various categories of
speech analysis and provides alternative and incredibly elastic
standards that are easily satisfied.
Sunstein's theory, on its face, asks whether the regulation
targets political speech. If the speech is not political speech, then
all that is needed for any content discriminatory restriction is a
legitimate purpose. 165 The legitimacy of the purpose is perhaps at
its zenith, for the purposes of non-political speech, where it seeks
to protect "real world harms."'66 Sunstein's free speech theory
effectively blends categorization with content discrimination to

160. Id. at 381.

161. Id. at 389.
162. Id.
163. See Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 599 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996).

164. Aguilar v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 854 n.4 (Cal. 1999)
(stating that "'[tihe emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a
'secondary effect'"). The Supreme Court of California nonetheless upheld the
regulation based on other grounds. Id.
165. SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 124.
166. Id. at 164.
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effectuate a method to protect political speech, subject to a
showing of grave harm caused by the speech. It leaves less
important speech-indeed the mundane-by the roadside, subject
only to a showing that the government has "legitimate, sufficiently
weighty reasons." 17
Indeed, Sunstein's approach can be said to require a really
damn good reason for restricting political speech but merely a
legitimate reason for suppressing normal, non-political speech."
The difference between the two standards is, of course, great.
There is an ocean of difference between justifications based on the
gravest showing of harms and those providing only legitimate
reasons. The practical application of this theory would place most
speech in the lower tier, allowing for easy censorship. Although
Sunstein intends to provide for legitimate standards to protect
non-political speech, even a nominally intelligent, yet overly
zealous, legislative body may thwart his standard. Thinking of a
legitimate reason or a "weighty" justification today means little
more than invoking the government's oft-famed calling card of the
interest of "police powers." Moreover, it may be possible to think
of real world harms that are associated with types of speech, even
though they are not caused by that speech.
The secondary effects doctrine feeds off of the crumbs of
Sunstein's theory. Just as Sunstein is willing to blur the lines
between categorization and content discrimination, so too the
secondary effects doctrine, which properly belongs within the
content discrimination approach, enables the government to
sidestep the strict scrutiny required for content-based laws where
the government claims to be attempting to prevent the harms
associated with some speech. It effectively bends the rules of free
speech analysis to serve its own needs. In practice, it has meant
that the secondary effects doctrine has primarily targeted
unpopular forms of speech like adult-entertainment.
Social
interest in stomping out such unpopular speech from the
marketplace of ideas provides the springboard from which the
government acts as parental censor, shielding society from the
immoral and the unpleasant, in an effort to preempt the social ills
that are associated with the speech. In this way, both theories
effectively abridge First Amendment protections when the
government is presenting a "weighty" justification to prevent
negative effects. The protections of the free speech doctrine simply
acquiesce to the invocation of a laudable purpose.
Perhaps most unsettling about both theories is that they
effectively remove sources of independent judgment making and
167. Id. at 124.
168. Of course, by "really damn good reason" I import Sunstein's notion that
political speech may only be restricted if there is a grave showing of harm. See
id. at 123-24.
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value setting from the true sovereigns, the individuals of the
nation, and give it to a centralized group of decision makers.
Indeed, Sunstein maintains that individuals relinquish this
control as part of the social contract and of a government by "We
Likewise, the secondary effects doctrine
the People."
superimposes value preference onto the speech, without saying so
directly.
The primary cases touching on the secondary effects doctrine
resonate in civic republican overtones. Just as Sunstein clearly
establishes a particularized form of value setting by favoring
political speech above all else, so too, the secondary effects doctrine
distinctly invokes the civic republican emphasis on democratic
debate and value preference. In Pap's A.M., Justice O'Connor
wrote for the plurality:
"[Elven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not
tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some
arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society's interest in
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser,
magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate," [and]
"few of us would march our sons or daughters off to war to preserve
anatomical areas exhibited at
the citizen's right to see" specified
169
establishments like Kandyland.
Clearly, the Supreme Court weaves Madisonian thought into
its discussion of the secondary effects.1 ° It is telling, however, that
the Supreme Court generally employs this line of patriotic,
republican, marching off to war rhetoric when it is addressing
speech that is largely disfavored by the popular element of society.
As Stephen Shiffrin observes, if the Court kept strictly to this
marching off to war standard, then "apparently no speech would
ever be protected."'' Moreover, Shiffrin contends by invoking such
"Meiklejohn rhetoric " 12 the Court utilizes civic republican
metaphor-protecting the core political speech and leaving
sexually explicit speech at the fringes or, as the Supreme Court
states, at the outer ambit.''
Because the success of the secondary effects rationale has
really only been established in nude dancing cases, it is difficult to
determine whether the Court is willing to invoke such civic
republican flourishes in secondary effects cases concerning other

169. Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. at 294 (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 70).
170. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 83, at 47, 54 (discussing how this republican

notion of the First Amendment is currently the principle understanding of the
First Amendment and discussing the republican salutations contained in the

preceding quote from Young and Pap'sA.M.).
171. Id. at 54.

Shiffm contends that the marching off to war metaphor

amounted to little more than a "passing stylistic flourish-a cheap shot." Id.
172. Id. at 54.
173. Barnes v. Glenn Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991).
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types of speech. What is unique about the secondary effects
doctrine, and what aligns it so closely with Sunstein, is that where
the government enacts value-setting legislation that, significantly
impedes non-political speech, is a laudable purpose for all
intensive purposes, the ends the inquiry into its legitimacy.
Although I raise no objection to the application of the
secondary effects doctrine to zoning ordinances of the type in
Renton and Young, my concern is whether such value preference
setting is either sufficient or appropriate to overcome serious First
Amendment protections when dealing with blatantly contentbased laws which directly impinge on the speech in question. In
this regard, it is notable that Justice Stevens, who first raised the
Madisonian marching off to war analogy in Young, wrote in his
dissent in Pap's A.M., that "[t]he fact that this censorship may
have a laudable ulterior purpose cannot mean that censorship is
not censorship.... Under today's opinion, a State may totally ban
speech based on its secondary effects ... yet the regulation is not
presumptively invalid."1 4
Additionally, while Sunstein does not expressly herald the
secondary effects doctrine as the harbinger of his republican
notion of the First Amendment, he nonetheless express approval of
the doctrine, saying:
[A] state could plausibly decide that some kinds of nude dancing are
associated with a range of serious real-world harms, including
prostitution, criminal activity of various sorts, and sexual assault.
At least this is so if the government can muster evidence that the
regulated form of nude dancing does produce these harms, which
would be sufficient to7 5justify regulation under the standards applied
to lower-tier speech'
Although Sunstein's reference to the secondary effects
doctrine is limited to the specific arena of nude dancing (the most
common invocation of the doctrine, after all), it is doubtless that
logical extensions of the secondary effects doctrine would meet his
approval, so long as the restriction in question limits speech based
on allegedly legitimate justifications like reducing the secondary
harm that is associated with the speech.
Under the secondary effects doctrine, the government sets the
value of the speech and effectively reduces the level of protection
by focusing on the social ills that are often associated with the
speech. However, the speech most likely to be associated with
social ills is, by nature, unpopular. Nevertheless, it is clear that
the speech prohibited by the secondary effects doctrine is not the
cause of the social ills. Indeed, there is no distinct line of

174. Pap'sA.M., 529 U.S. at 322-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. SUNSTEIN, THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, supra note 7, at 164 (citing
Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Barnes).
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causation connecting the social ill to what is said, expressly or
symbolically. Although the government may seek to cure social
ills by targeting secondarily related sources, rather than the
directly responsible source, it only succeeds in limiting the most
visible associate of the ill and not the source of the harm. This
rationale misplaces the social "blame" for a culture in disrepute
onto the safety valve of the same culture.'76 It blames the fruit of
such a culture and not the culture itself.
The trouble with both civic republicanism and the secondary
effects doctrine is that both remove the individual sources of
judgment making and value-setting from the consuming public
and place them with the parochial government. My fundamental
objection to these doctrines is firmly grounded with their explicit
and implicit rejection of the Holmesian free speech marketplace.
That is, just as quickly as a market conception of free speech is
rejected, so too, the government is replete with the possibility for
censorship. Indeed, by eliminating the speech as a commodity, the
"consumer" loses his ability to make an independent judgment
formation. Although this is the fundamental underpinning of
Sunstein's republican conception of the First Amendment, it is one
that I believe is fundamentally misplaced. In a free market of
speech, the individual should act as consumer, setting his own
judgment preferences and deciding how best to allocate speech
resources. Moreover, criminal laws subject preferences that are so
blatantly immoral-like child pornography-to criminal liability,
such that this type of speech should not be considered an invasion
into the individual's preference setting.
However, when the
government acts as the parental censor telling the individual what
she may or may not say or hear, then the best allocations of speech
resources will be hampered. More importantly, governmental
decision makers remove individual autonomy from the consuming
listener. However, because civic republicanism and the republican
flourishes of the secondary effects doctrine place the sovereignty of
the nation above that of the individual (as part and parcel of the
social contract), the individual's preferences are subordinate to the
government. With this in mind, Judge Posner, facing the public
nudity statute upheld by the Supreme Court in Barnes, wrote:
Once the relevant marketplace is understood to include expressive
activity concerned with emotions as well as expressive activities
concerned with ideas ...
it becomes evident that erotic
performances are a major component of the First Amendment
marketplace.... Censorship of erotica is pretty ridiculous... What
176. Smolla and Nimmer identify the safety valve concept, enabling the
market to effectuate democratic principles, as one of the three functions of the
First Amendment.

See SMOLLA, 1 SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF

SPEECH, supra note 102, §§ 2:1-2:7. The two other functions of free speech
include enlightenment and self-fulfillment. Id.
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kind of people make a career of checking to see whether the covering
of a woman's nipples is fully opaque, as the statute requires?...
Many of us do not admire busybodies who want to bring the force of
the law down on the heads of adults whose harmless private
pleasures the busybodies find177revolting. The history of censorship is
a history of folly and cruelty.
CONCLUSION

Much like the end of the nineteenth century,'78 the end of the
twentieth century saw a significant rise in rhetoric on popular
morality and civic virtue in both social and political debate. 179 The
cry for cultural reformation must necessarily focus on the content
of speech, 8 ° because speech is the most easily accessible indicator
of the pulse of society. Indeed, in a culture deluged by information
and modes of communication, First Amendment analysis
necessarily plays a central role in any attempt to effectuate a
governmental response to the demands for change.
Nonetheless, we must question whether removing preference
formation from the individual and giving it to the government is a
proper form of governance. While the forms of speech attacked by
177. See Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1097-1100 (7th
Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., concurring) (finding an Indiana statute, which required
nude dancers to wear a G-string and pasties, to be unconstitutional under the
First Amendment), rev'd sub nom, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560
(1991).
178. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries gave rise to two
successive political movements-populism and progressivism. ROBERT W.
CHERNY, POPULISM, PROGRESSIVISM,
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
NEBRASKA POLITICS, 1885-1915 151-66 (1981) (discussing the geographical

origins of the two movements, populism as an agrarian movement and
progressivism as primarily urban); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF
REFORM; FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 131-35 (1st ed. 1955) (same). Although these
movements differed, they nonetheless maintained a similar desire for reform
and the elimination of corrupting influences in government and mass culture.
See J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories,
104 YALE L.J. 1935, 1946-48 (1995).

179. See Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the
Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications,
79 CAL. L. REV. 267, 267-68 (1991) (discussing the flourish of discussion of
civic republicanism and its focus on civic virtue and communitarian
deliberation).
180. The Federal Trade Commission issued a report calling for selfregulation of the music, movie, and video game industries and their marketing
strategies. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, MARKETING VIOLENT
ENTERTAINMENT TO CHILDREN: A REVIEW OF SELF-REGULATION AND
INDUSTRY PRACTICES IN THE MOTION PICTURE, Music RECORDING &
ELECTRONIC
GAME
INDUSTRIES
(Sept.
2000)
available
at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2O00/09/index.htm. For a discussion of the rap music
industry's emphasis on sex, violence, and greed and the internal split over the
value of such content, see generally Allison Samuels et al., Battle for the Soul
of Hip-Hop, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 9, 2000, at 58-65.
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the secondary effects doctrine may conform to popular morality,
we must consciously challenge governmental efforts to silence
speech and expression. Certainly, the lessons taught by the
histories of highly centralized governments show that chilling and
freezing speech is a quick and incredibly effective method of
consolidating support. 8" Additionally, it should be noted that even
our own country's experience with centralizing popular morality
(i.e. prohibition) met a disastrous result. While Sunstein's civic
republican thought takes up the gauntlet of cultural reform, I
cannot help but question the implied assumption that our culture
is engrossed in a moral depression and the only escape is through
moral regulations that limit speech.
Finally, I find it difficult to fathom living in Sunstein's world,
one where the citizen must constantly think about the political
process and live every moment participating in deliberative
democracy. Moreover, the secondary effects doctrine picks up on
civic republican thought by permitting regulations based on the
notion that chilling certain speech will reduce the social ills that
are associated with, not caused by, the speech. Indeed, efforts to
combat the ailing ideologies of our culture necessarily begin by
chilling the channel of the dissemination of ideas, and culminate
in the abrogation of our sacred right to speech itself.
Postscript:

I finish thinking about Cass Sunstein, about secondary effects, about
strip clubs and about "free" speech. I find myself driving in my car.
I drive through industrial corridors. I drive past projects. I drive
past people everywhere engaged in conversation. I go to 7-11 for a

bean burrito. I place the tender frozen folds of tortilla in the green
wrapper in the microwave and set the timer for three minutes. I do
not think about what it means to be a citizen or to be engaged in
deliberative democracy.

181. See, e.g., DINA R. SPECHLER, PERMITTED DISSENT IN THE USSR: Novy
MIR AND THE SOVIET REGIME 52-60 (1982) (discussing Khrushchev's policies
towards the arts); PRISCILLA JOHNSON, KHRUSHCHEV AND THE ARTS: THE
POLITICS OF SOVIET CULTURE, 1962-1964 1-93 (1965) (discussing Soviet

policies towards the visual arts both before and after the Cuban missile crisis).
In the Soviet Union, for example, chilling and freezing speech and the

dissident arts served as a critical tool for consolidating political support by
crushing ideas emanating from the margins of Soviet society. See generally
SPECHLER, supra.

